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Abstract
We investigate empirically the extent of misreporting in a poverty-
alleviation program in which self-reported information, followed by a
household visit, is used to determine eligibility. In the model we pro-
pose and estimate, underreporting may be due to a deception motive,
and overreporting to an embarrassment motive. We ￿nd that under-
reporting of goods and desirable home characteristics is widespread,
and that overreporting is common with respect to goods linked to
social status. Larger program bene￿ts encourage underreporting and
discourage overreporting. We also estimate the costs of lying and em-
barrassment for di⁄erent goods, and show that the embarrassment
cost for lacking a good is proportional to the percentage of households
who own the good.
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icana de Cultura.1 Introduction
Targeted poverty-alleviation programs rely on the ability to identify the poor
population from the non-poor. The costs of identifying the poor are presum-
ably larger in developing countries, where variables such as income cannot
be independently veri￿ed (for example through tax institutions). As a con-
sequence, targeted programs in developing countries usually rely on informa-
tion provided by the applicants. It is widely believed that the incentives for
underreporting of economic conditions in this context are quite large. Nev-
ertheless, to our knowledge, no previous research has analyzed the extent
to which individuals misreport their characteristics when applying for social
programs. This lack of research is because the data requirements are severe,
e.g. information is needed on what an individual reports to a government
agency when applying for a program, as well as independent information
on the ￿true￿characteristics of the individual. In this paper, we employ a
very unusual database from Oportunidades, the Mexican government main
poverty-alleviation scheme, to explore quantitatively the extent and causes
of misreporting in social programs.
Economists usually assume that individuals tell the truth only if this is
incentive-compatible given the material outcomes. According to conventional
assumptions, applicants to a social program will understate their material
possessions, so long as this increases the probability of bene￿tting from the
program. A corollary of this view is that underreporting should be made
costly by the program requirements.1 If underreporting is not costly, we
can expect potential bene￿ciaries to display a strategic bias toward decep-
tion. Ethical considerations may act as a counterweight,2 however, so that
the willingness of individuals to deceive for advantage is worth exploring
quantitatively.
Research in participation in welfare programs reminds us that very often
individuals do not apply to a program even if participation seems convenient
given the material outcomes. This has been interpreted by Mo¢ tt (1983) and
others as the result of a social ￿stigma￿or utility loss associated with par-
1See e.g. Besley and Coate (1992, 1995).
2See Bok (1999) for a thoughtful review of the positions of moral philosophers about
deception, and the recent article by Gneezy (2005) for some experimental evidence.
1ticipation.3 By analogy, we may expect that even some individuals who are
willing to apply may have a bias toward overreporting due to embarrassment
or stigma associated with the lack of certain material goods.
We use a database from the Mexican program Oportunidades to estimate
a model of reporting in the context of social programs that encompasses
both deception and embarrassment considerations. When this program was
introduced in urban localities in 2002, an advertising campaign was carried
out to inform potential applicants that registration centers for the program
would open during certain dates. Applicants who turned up at the regis-
tration centers were asked to provide information on their address and on
their household characteristics. Eligibility into the program was determined
using the household characteristics to compute a household poverty index.4
Applicants initially found to be eligible received a household visit during the
coming weeks to verify the information given, after which a ￿nal classi￿cation
on eligibility was made.
Our database is rather unique in that it includes not only what individuals
reported at the registration center but also what they were actually found
to have during the household visit for over a million households. Thus, we
can check whether applicants reported correctly, understated or overstated
their possessions in answering the questionnaire. Since we can calculate the
bene￿ts for each applicant according to program rules, we have information
about what was at stake for each applicant.
We propose and estimate a one-agent decision model, where underreport-
ing is imputed to ￿nancial incentives, truthful reporting to a cost for lying,
and overreporting to an embarrassment motive. While simple, the model
captures the relevant trade-o⁄s for an applicant to a social program that
uses self-reported information. An applicant who has some desirable house-
hold characteristic will report not having it if the increase in the probability
of getting into the program by lying, multiplied by the program bene￿ts,
3Riphahn (2001) provides some recent evidence on widespread lack of participation
in social programs by potential bene￿ciaries. See also Currie (2006) for a review of the
literature on take up.
4The weights attached to each answer in the household poverty index were previously
determined using a poverty regression similar to the methodology described by Ravallion
(1996). The general methodology was public (Reglas de Operaci￿n 2002) but not the
speci￿c weights.
2exceeds the cost of lying. An applicant who does not have some desirable
household characteristic will report having it if the embarrassment cost ex-
ceeds the increase in the probability of getting into the program by telling
the truth, multiplied by the program bene￿ts.
We ￿nd that underreporting is widespread in every item we investigate.
Overreporting is common in goods that may have a ￿status￿value. Both
underreporting and overreporting are clearly sensitive to material incentives.
Larger program bene￿ts encourage underreporting and discourage overre-
porting. Quantitatively speaking, though, the impact of program bene￿ts
on misreporting is not overwhelming at the margin. As an illustration, in-
creasing in 50% the monetary bene￿ts from the program (which were close
to 26% of the households￿preprogram expenditure) would increase underre-
porting in a few percentage points, and would have an even smaller impact
in deterring overreporting. There is also evidence that there are forces at
work other than material incentives in the decision to misreport or report
accurately. For instance, education discourages underreporting and, very
clearly, encourages overreporting. This is interesting because education may
be linked to socialization and therefore to sensitivity to status considerations.
The results suggest that the use of self-reported household characteristics
in targeting poverty-alleviation programs can be improved upon by taking
into account both under and overreporting in the allocation of weights to
household characteristics. For instance, the eligibility index employed by
Oportunidades o¢ cials gave some weight to gas boilers, cars, trucks, and
washing machines, all items for which underreporting was rampant. The
index also gave weight to toilets, tap water, and concrete ￿ oor, items for
which overreporting was common. While underreporting may have been
corrected at the household visit stage, overreporting is worrisome because it
may have led to the exclusion of the program of households that could qualify
in principle. It is also a problem that is harder to deal with: If a poverty
index accurately identi￿es goods whose absence is a clear indicator of poverty,
it is also probably identifying goods associated with a higher social status.
Our analysis is necessarily limited to applicants to the poverty-alleviation
program; there may be possibly a large number of households with stronger
embarrassment motives who do not even apply to the program.
At a broader level, there has recently been a surge of interest by econo-
3mists on the issue of deception in a variety of contexts.5 The experimental
work of Gneezy (2005) shows that in two-party interactions people care both
about their own gains and about the losses to the other party in deciding
whether to deceive. Other experimental studies reviewed by Croson (2005)
reveal that deception is widespread and that generally individuals are not
su¢ ciently skeptical of statements they receive from others. Our setup is
di⁄erent in that individuals￿deceptive behavior does not create losses for
another easily identi￿ed individual, so that the unwillingness to lie cannot
be attributed to altruism.
Overreporting may be due at least in part to inaccurate beliefs similar to
the overcon￿dence or ￿self-serving bias￿described by Babcock and Loewen-
stein (1997) in other contexts. Overreporters may feel better about them-
selves by believing that their house ￿ oor is accurately described as mostly
covered by concrete rather than dirt, even if an ￿impartial￿observer, such
as the visitor sent by the program, may disagree.
Our results about the costs of lying and embarrassment are very valuable
to the extent that it is unusual to ￿nd ￿eld data (as opposed to experimental
data) on communication games. A preference for telling the truth is impor-
tant for the working of many social institutions in di⁄erent settings, from
poverty measurement to opinion polls for policy purposes to the justice sys-
tem. Our results illustrate that not only ￿nancial motives but also social and
psychological motives play a role in determining whether individuals tell the
truth or not. Social and psychological motives may deter individuals from
lying for ￿nancial advantage, and conversely, a social motive like embarrass-
ment may induce individuals to overreport in spite of ￿nancial costs.6 The
results thus provide concrete evidence on the relative importance of ￿nancial
versus social and psychological motives for truthtelling behavior.
5Including among others Crawford (2003), Chen (2005), Ettinger and Jehiel (2006),
and Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007).
6This point is reminiscent of the costly management of ￿social information￿(the infor-
mation the individual directly conveys about himself) described by Go⁄man (1963).
42 Evidence on Misreporting
Table I provides evidence on misreporting in Oportunidades from a random
sample of 101,803 applicants (10% of the applicants interviewed at the reg-
istration centers in 2002). Out of this sample, 74,034 applicants initially
quali￿ed and received a household veri￿cation visit. We have calculated un-
der and overreporting as follows. For each of the goods or desirable household
characteristics g, let Ag be the set of applicants who asserted having the good
at the registration center interview, and let Dg be the set of applicants who
denied having the good at the interview. Similarly, let Hg be the set of appli-
cants who were found to have the good at the household visit, and let Ng be
the set of applicants who were found not to have the good at the household
visit. We de￿ne








Underreporting is substantial for every item described in Table I. Since
there are a few goods, such as cars, trucks, phones and video recorders, that
may have been hidden during the household visit, we may be understating
the already high incidence of underreporting for these goods. Other items
seem much harder to hide.
Overreporting is substantial only for a few items in Table I, including
toilets, tap water, gas stoves, and concrete ￿ oor. This list suggests that
applicants may have been embarrassed to report the lack of these items,
or perhaps unwilling to acknowledge their true household characteristics.
Toilets, tap water, and a concrete ￿ oor are widespread among the urban
poor in our sample, and lacking some of these may carry a stigma.
The incentive to lie to participate in the program has been substantial;
the average monthly cash bene￿t of participation for urban households is
about 26.4% of the average applicant￿ s household pre-program expenditure
in our sample. Cash bene￿ts for participants in Oportunidades (see Table
II) include grants conditional on the school attendance of the children in the
household which vary by the grade of schooling and gender of each child as




(as % of Households (as % of Households Having Good
Good Having Good) Not Having Good) (as % of Total)
Concrete Floor 14.45 25.41 64.25
Tap Water 13.79 31.76 70.27
Toilet 16.58 39.07 73.08
Gas Boiler 73.12 1.07 3.22
Washing Machine 53.46 6.20 8.49
Phone 73.12 1.34 2.64
Car 83.10 0.80 1.54
Truck 81.71 0.61 1.53
Satellite TV 73.91 1.74 2.32
Water Tank 58.44 3.80 5.18
Refrigerator 36.93 12.05 27.07
Gas Stove 24.25 28.56 48.40
Video Recorder 79.73 1.98 3.25
aObservations: 74034. Source: ENCASURB.
6bers. The program also includes free medical consultations and nutrition
supplements.7 Since we can calculate the potential cash bene￿ts a house-
hold can receive under the program, we have an idea about the incentive
to underreport (or the disincentive to overreport) for each applicant. Table
III provides some additional information on the applicants and their house-
holds. Most applicants are women, which is consistent with the fact that the
transfers under the program are paid to the mother of the household.
Our data source is the ENCASURB (Encuesta Socio-Econ￿mica de los
Hogares Urbanos), the survey used to establish eligibility for Oportunidades
for urban households. The ENCASURB consists of three related question-
naires. The ￿rst is the ￿inclusion questionnaire￿which was applied to ap-
plicants at the registration center. Applicants were informed whether they
qualify or not on the spot. Applicants who quali￿ed for a household visit, and
a large fraction of those who did not, were asked to answer a second question-
naire about themselves and their households. Finally, applicants who were
initially declared eligible were informed that they would receive a household
visit in the next two or three weeks. A ￿veri￿cation questionnaire￿(sim-
ilar to the inclusion questionnaire) was applied during the household visit.
Applicants were required to let interviewers into their households to visually
inspect their belongings. Table I employs the answers to the ￿rst and third
questionnaire, and Table III the answers to the second.
There are a couple of potential selection issues in relation to our data.
We study the reporting of only those individuals who apply, whereas it is
commonly the case that many eligible households do not apply to targeted
social programs.8 In addition, not all households who apply were veri￿ed
and this is likely directly related to their reporting. While most individuals
are initially declared eligible, note that underreporting can only increase the
likelihood of being declared eligible at the module whereas overreporting can
7There has been a good deal of research estimating the impact of program bene￿ts on
participating households in rural areas in terms of education and health, including Schultz
(2004), Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005), Gertler (2004), and Todd and Wolpin (2006),
among others.
8We are studying the application decision in related work. In a sample of poor urban
areas approximately 65 percent of eligible households applied to the program. Of those
not applying, 84 percent can be attributed to lack of knowledge of the program or the lack
of a registration module in the vicinity.
7Table II
Monthly Cash Benefits of Oportunidadesa
Grants Nutrition Grant 150
Education Grants: Grade Boys Girls




Middle School 7 290 310
8 310 340
9 325 375
High School 10 490 565
11 525 600
12 555 635
Maximum Transfer With High-School Children 1550
to Household Other Households 915
Average Transferb 350
aIn Mexican pesos (2002); 11 pesos is approx. US$1. bUrban households (2003).
Table III
Applicants and their Householdsa
Veri￿ed Group Not Veri￿ed Group
Household Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Total Monthly Expenditure (pesos) 1312 766 1405 735
Per Capita Expenditure (pesos) 319 193 382 219
Family Size 4.54 1.93 4.05 1.73
Children from 0 to 5 0.77 0.87 0.49 0.71
Children from 6 to 21 1.90 1.54 1.63 1.37
Applicant Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender (Female=1) 0.94 0.23 0.94 0.24
Age 38.21 14.46 40.47 14.43
Education 4.44 3.39 5.05 3.49
Working 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
Married 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50
Cohabitating 0.22 0.42 0.16 0.36
Look very poor to interviewer 0.37 0.48 0.24 0.43
aObservations: 74034 veri￿ed and 10424 not veri￿ed applicants. Source: ENCASURB.
8reduce the likelihood. Thus, in our sample of veri￿ed individuals, ceteris
paribus, we are more likely to have underreporters than overreporters. This
is of course important not only for potential selection, but for the implication
that those who overreport may not receive bene￿ts precisely because of their
overreporting.
In the next section, we model the decision about reporting of an appli-
cant who understands that these reports are used to determine whether her
household quali￿es or not for a social program.
3 Misreporting and Incentives
Consider an applicant to a social program who is asked to answer a question-
naire about whether the applicant￿ s household has or not some goods or de-
sirable characteristics (e.g. phone, tap water, concrete ￿ oor, etc.). Denoting
applicants by a = 1;:::;n and goods by g = 1;:::;m, the report of appli-
cant a is a vector (rag)m
g=1 2 f0;1gm, where rag = 1 means ￿yes￿and rag = 0
means ￿no.￿In answering the questionnaire, applicant a is aware of the true
answers to the questions, which are represented by (tag)m
g=1 2 f0;1gm. We say
that applicant a overreports, underreports or reports truthfully with regard
to good g if rag > tag, rag < tag, or rag = tag, respectively.
Eligibility into the program is determined in the following manner. There
is a vector of weights assigned to each good (!g)m
g=1 2 <m
+, and a cuto⁄￿ ￿ 0
(the ￿poverty line￿ ). With probability 1 ￿ ￿, the applicant is eligible for
the program if
P
g !grag ￿ ￿. With probability ￿, the applicant is eligible if P
g !grag +
P
g ￿g(tag ￿ rag)+ ￿ ￿. Here, ￿ represents the probability that
there is some e⁄ective monitoring of the applicant￿ s household goods, and
￿g represents the penalty the applicant expects to receive for underreporting
with respect to good g if monitoring turns out to be e⁄ective.9 If the appli-
cant expects that e⁄ective veri￿cation will result at least in the correction of
underreporting, we would have ￿g ￿ !g.10
9Applicants may have believed that either there was not going to be a veri￿cation visit
with some probability, or that interviewers would not be careful. These beliefs, of course,
may turn out to be incorrect ex post.
10Program operating rules state that ￿Program bene￿ts will be suspended permanently
when the family has given false information with respect to their socioeconomic conditions￿
9We assume that applicants hold point beliefs about the vectors ($g)m
g=1
and (￿g)m
g=1. We also assume that applicants believe that ￿ is uniformly dis-
tributed in some interval (0;￿) where ￿ ￿
P
g maxf!g;￿gg. Thus, according

















g wgrag ￿ ￿
P
g pg(tag ￿ rag)+;
where wg ￿ !g=￿ and pg ￿ ￿g=￿.
Let U(￿) be the indirect utility function of applicant a, let Ya be her pre-
program income and let Ba be the monetary bene￿ts of participating in the
program. The utility gain of being eligible for the program is then
￿U(Ya;Ba) ￿ U(Ya + Ba) ￿ U(Ya):
Finally, let cag be the utility cost of ￿concealing￿good g or at least trying
to do so, which is su⁄ered by applicant a whenever she underreports, and let
eag be the utility cost of ￿embarrassment￿with respect to good g, which is
su⁄ered by applicant a whenever reporting truthfully not having the good.







g cag(tag ￿ rag)+ ￿
P
g eag(1 ￿ rag ￿ tag)+
￿
:
From the solution to this problem, the applicant will underreport about good
g if tag = 1 and
(wg ￿ ￿pg)￿U(Ya;Ba) ￿ cag:
That is, an applicant who has good g will report not having it if the increase
in the probability of getting into the program by lying (wg ￿￿pg), multiplied
by the program bene￿ts, exceeds the cost of lying.
(Reglas de Operaci￿n 2002). Interviewers were not instructed to inform applicants about
this program rule, though. As discussed later on, apparently there was no penalty other
than the correction of underreporting.
11Note that the probability of being eligible is additively separable in the reports about
the di⁄erent goods. Separability follows from the assumption of uniform beliefs about the
cuto⁄ for eligibility into the program, and it is useful in terms of estimating the model.
10Similarly, the applicant will overreport about good g if tag = 0 and
eag ￿ wg￿U(Ya;Ba):
That is, an applicant who does not have good g will report having it if the
embarrassment cost exceeds the increase in the probability of getting into
the program by telling the truth (wg), multiplied by the program bene￿ts.
We assume that applicants have a constant relative risk aversion utility
function with risk parameter ￿; that is12
￿U(Ya;Ba) =
￿
(Ya + Ba)1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Y 1￿￿
a =(1 ￿ ￿) if ￿ 6= 1
ln(Ya + Ba) ￿ lnYa if ￿ = 1:
We assume further that cga and ega depend linearly on a vector of observ-
able applicant characteristics Xa and a random term; that is
cag = ￿cg + ￿cgXa + ￿cag and eag = ￿eg + ￿egXa + ￿eag;
where ￿1ag and ￿2ag are random terms independently distributed across goods
and across people according to logistic distributions with location parameter
0 and scale parameter s1g and s2g, respectively.
Thus, applicant a will underreport about good g if tag = 1 and
(1) ￿1g + ￿1g￿U(Ya;Ba) + ￿1gXa ￿ ￿1ag;
and will overreport about good g if tag = 0 and
(2) ￿2g + ￿2g￿U(Ya;Ba) + ￿2gXa ￿ ￿2ag;
where ￿1g = ￿￿cg=s1g, ￿1g = (wg ￿￿pg)=s1g, ￿1g = ￿￿cg=s1g, ￿1ag = ￿cag=s1g,
￿2g = ￿eg=s2g, ￿2g = ￿wg=s2g, ￿2g = ￿eg=s2g and ￿2ag = ￿￿eag=s2g. Note that
the error terms have a standard logistic distribution. Under the assumption
that household visits were in fact e⁄ective in monitoring misreporting, equa-
tions (1) and (2) can then be estimated using logistic regressions.
12We are sidestepping for simplicity the issue of the di⁄erent horizon of bene￿ts for dif-
ferent applicants, according to the age and school grade of their children. If household a
has a horizon of bene￿ts Ta and discount factor ￿a, then its expected bene￿t of participat-
ing should be multiplied by (1 ￿ ￿
Ta+1
a )=(1 ￿ ￿a). If this term is similar for all applicants
(e.g. they all discount the future heavily) ignoring it is just a normalization of the utility
function.
114 Empirical Analysis
We have estimated equations (1) and (2) for the di⁄erent goods, using as
samples respectively those households who were found to have the good and
those households who were not, with data from ENCASURB. We take Ya
to be the expenditure per capita in the household of the applicant, as re-
ported in the second questionnaire, and Ba to be the potential cash bene￿t
from the program for the household in per capita terms, calculated using
the structure of program bene￿ts and the age and schooling levels of house-
hold members pre-program (Table II). The independent variables included in
the regressions, other than the utility gain ￿U(Ya;Ba), are age of the appli-
cant, years of education, gender, whether the applicant works outside his or
her house, whether the applicant speaks an indigenous language, per capita
expenditure in the applicant￿ s household, and a set of dummies re￿ ecting
subjective judgements of the interviewer: whether the applicant looks ￿very
poor,￿￿somewhat poor,￿or ￿not poor,￿and whether the applicant seems
to understand the questionnaire.13 We also include registration center ￿xed
e⁄ects, in an attempt to deal with unobserved heterogeneity both in who
attends di⁄erent registration centers and in treatment of applicants across
centers.
Maximum likelihood estimation of equations (1) and (2) yield values of
￿ near one (that is, between 0:7 and 1:3) for most goods.14 For the purpose
of comparability across goods, in what follows we focus on estimates based
on ￿ = 1. We also discuss estimates based on other values of ￿.
By the time the information on expenditure was collected, applicants
knew that they quali￿ed for the program and knew also that reported ex-
penditure was not among the criteria for participation in the program. Nev-
ertheless, we may think that a person that under or overreported with respect
to goods may be inclined to do the same with respect to expenditure. We
13Interviewers were also asked if they thought the applicants were lying. Consistent
with the evidence that individuals are bad at detecting the deception of others (Croson
2005), interviewers answered that they thought they were told the truth in 98.64% of the
cases.
14There are a few exceptions: equations (1) and (2) yield values of ￿ below 0.5 for car,
and equation (1) yield values of ￿ above 1.7 for gas boiler, phone, video recorder and
satellite TV.
12thus include among our estimations the case of risk-neutrality (￿ = 0), in
which the utility gain of participating does not depend on the expenditure
per capita in the household of the applicant.
4.1 Utility Gains and Applicants￿Beliefs
Table IV provides maximum likelihood estimates of ￿1g and ￿2g for di⁄erent
goods, using as samples respectively those households who were found to
have the good and those households who were not. Estimates in Table IV
are provided for ￿ = 1.
In agreement with the model, ^ ￿1g is positive and signi￿cant in almost
every item for both sets of estimations. The results are thus very supportive
of the e⁄ect of bene￿ts in encouraging underreporting. Note that the few
items in which the model performs badly, such as phones and trucks, are
among those in which the assumption of e⁄ective monitoring of underreport-
ing is suspect.
Also in agreement with the model, ^ ￿2g is negative in almost every item.
^ ￿2g is signi￿cant at 10% in most items in which it is negative, although signif-
icance levels are less impressive in equation (2) than in equation (1). When
￿xed e⁄ects are considered, signi￿cance is reduced in most items, except no-
tably in concrete ￿ oor. Overall, the results are somewhat supportive of the
e⁄ect of bene￿ts in discouraging overreporting.
According to the model, for each good g, we have ￿1g=(￿￿2g) ￿ s2g=s1g.
In Table IV we have that ^ ￿1g is larger than ^ ￿2g in absolute value for almost
every good, implying that s1g is smaller than s2g. Recall that the variance of
a logistic distribution is proportional to the scale parameter. Thus, Table IV
suggests that for almost every good the variance of the error term in the cost
of lying is smaller than the variance of the error term in the embarrassment
cost.
Table V provides estimates of the relative weight of each good according
to the estimated coe¢ cients for equations (1) and (2). We assume that
underreporters believe that the penalty for underreporting is proportional to
the weight of each good. In terms of the discussion in the previous paragraph,
the assumption here is that the variance of ￿cag is the same across goods, and
13Table IV
Estimated Coefficient of Utility Gains on Misreportinga
Underreporting Equation Overreporting Equation
Without Reg. Center Without Reg. Center
Good Fixed E⁄ects Fixed E⁄ects Fixed E⁄ects Fixed E⁄ects
Concrete Floor 0.2276 0.2210 -0.0654 -0.1435
(0.0549) (0.0576) (0.0590) (0.0621)
Tap Water 0.2073 0.1447 -0.0322 -0.0876
(0.0536) (0.0566) (0.0591) (0.0668)
Toilet 0.1602 0.1528 -0.1287 -0.0959
(0.0486) (0.0526) (0.0614) (0.0663)
Gas Boiler 0.8035 0.5357 -0.3022 -0.2430
(0.2534) (0.2786) (0.1744) (0.1787)
Washing Machine 0.3853 0.1309 -0.3672 -0.0743
(0.1278) (0.1383) (0.0775) (0.0790)
Phone -0.1175 -0.5016 -0.3050 -0.1027
(0.2547) (0.2947) (0.1554) (0.1587)
Car 1.5715 0.4476 -0.3194 -0.1887
(0.4904) (0.6140) (0.1988) (0.2025)
Truck -0.8698 -1.2556 0.0437 0.1574
(0.3640) (0.4428) (0.1954) (0.1951)
Satellite TV 0.8467 0.0705 0.1800 0.0765
(0.2906) (0.4520) (0.1156) (0.1231)
Water Tank 0.5520 0.4628 -0.2012 -0.0931
(0.1663) (0.1835) (0.0917) (0.0952)
Refrigerator 0.5263 0.4305 -0.2225 -0.1055
(0.0721) (0.0760) (0.0591) (0.0628)
Gas Stove 0.5461 0.4049 -0.3641 -0.3478
(0.0561) (0.0603) (0.0507) (0.0545)
Video Recorder 0.7300 0.3341 -0.3024 -0.0470
(0.2791) (0.3247) (0.1287) (0.1306)
aWith moderate risk-aversion (￿ = 1). Standard errors in parenthesis; observations:
74034.
14Table V
Weights of Goods in Program Participationa
Estimated Weights
Good Under-Reporters Over-Reporters
Concrete Floor 0.035 0.025
Tap Water 0.032 0.012
Toilet 0.024 0.049
Gas Boiler 0.123 0.116




Satellite TV 0.129 0.000
Water Tank 0.084 0.077
Refrigerator 0.080 0.085
Gas Stove 0.083 0.139
Video Recorder 0.111 0.116
aWith moderate risk-aversion (￿ = 1) and without ￿xed e⁄ects. Observations: 74034.
similarly for ￿eag. Relative weights are calculated as
weight of good g for under-reporters =
maxf0; ^ ￿1gg
P
g0 maxf0; ^ ￿1g0g
; and





(We censor in each case the two estimated coe¢ cients with incorrect signs
from the point of view of the model.) Estimated relative weights for un-
der and over-reporters are not far o⁄ for about half the items, in particular
when compared with the true relative weights (obtained from administrative
sources and omitted in the table). Note that, since applicants were unlikely
to have access to the weights employed by the program, the assumption that
applicants had common beliefs about the weights is only a useful simpli￿ca-
tion.
154.2 E⁄ect of Program Bene￿ts on Misreporting
Next, we have estimated the e⁄ect of a marginal increase in per capita ben-
e￿ts of the program on the number of applicants who underreport as a per-
centage of those having the good, and on the number of applicants who
overreport as a percentage of those lacking the good. For each item g and for
each applicant a who has this good, the marginal increase in the probability
of underreporting is equal to






Thus, the marginal increase in the probability of underreporting for applicant
a can be estimated as
^ ￿1gf(^ ￿1g + ^ ￿1g￿U(Ya;Ba) + ^ ￿1gXa) ￿ (Ya + Ba)
￿￿;
where f(z) ￿ exp(z)=(1 + exp(z))2.
We evaluate the expression above at the mean values of the exogenous
variables for those having the good, and multiply this value by one hundred
to obtain the marginal e⁄ect of the program bene￿ts on underreporting.
The marginal e⁄ect on overreporting is calculated similarly. (Note that,
consistently with Table I, we de￿ne underreporting of good g as the number
of applicants who underreport as a percentage of the number of applicants
who have this good, and de￿ne overreporting similarly.)
Table VI displays the results for four values of the risk-aversion coe¢ cient.
The signi￿cance levels are those of the estimated coe¢ cient of ￿U(Ya;Ba).
In terms of ￿tting the signs predicted by the model and in terms of sig-
ni￿cance, the intermediate value of risk-aversion (￿ = 1) does better than
the high value (￿ = 2) for both underreporting and overreporting, and does
better than the low values (￿ = 1=2 and ￿ = 0) for overreporting and at
least comparably for underreporting.15 If we are concerned about the use of
reported expenditure per capita in the calculation of the utility gain, Table
VI is reassuring: the results obtained measuring the utility gain as the cash
15Consumption studies, such as that of Banks et al. (2001) in the UK, estimate the
coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion in around 2. With a di⁄erent methodology, experimental
studies both in the lab (Holt and Laury 2002) and in the ￿eld (Tanaka, Camerer and
Nguyen 2006) favor estimates of around 1/2.
16Table VI
Marginal Effect of Per Capita Benefits on Misreportinga
Risk Neutrality (￿ = 0) Low Risk Aversion (￿ = 1=2)
E⁄ect on E⁄ect on E⁄ect on E⁄ect on
Good Underreport Overreport Underreport Overreport
Concrete Floor 0.0089*** -0.0055 0.0193*** -0.0085
Tap Water 0.0025 0.0068 0.0091** 0.0089
Toilet 0.0006 -0.0047 0.0050 -0.0131
Gas Boiler 0.0304** -0.0008 0.0704*** -0.0018*
Washing Machine 0.0294*** -0.0044*** 0.0633*** -0.0110***
Phone 0.0025 -0.0010* -0.0016 -0.0027**
Car 0.0546*** -0.0011** 0.1154*** -0.0023**
Truck -0.0150 0.0002 -0.0549** -0.0001
Cable/Satellite TV 0.0115 0.0007 0.0463 0.0020
Water Tank 0.0307*** -0.0012 0.0685*** -0.0034*
Refrigerator 0.0354*** -0.0025 0.0788*** -0.0078*
Gas Stove 0.0253*** -0.0163*** 0.0561*** -0.0356***
VCR 0.0134 -0.0014** 0.0416* -0.0035**
Mod. Risk Aversion (￿ = 1) High Risk Aversion (￿ = 2)
E⁄ect on E⁄ect on E⁄ect on E⁄ect on
Good Underreport Overreport Underreport Overreport
Concrete Floor 0.0076*** -0.0037 -0.0001 0.0000
Tap Water 0.0068*** -0.0020 0.0001 -0.0001
Toilet 0.0062*** -0.0089** 0.0002** 0.0000
Gas Boiler 0.0386*** -0.0008* 0.0233*** 0.0000
Washing Machine 0.0255*** -0.0055*** 0.0002 0.0001**
Phone -0.0056 -0.0010** -0.0023 0.0000
Car 0.0552*** -0.0006 0.0242** 0.0000
Truck -0.0298** 0.0001 -0.0031 0.0000
Cable/Satellite TV 0.0435*** 0.0008 0.0552*** 0.0000
Water Tank 0.0356*** -0.0019** 0.0123** 0.0000
Refrigerator 0.0326*** -0.0067*** -0.0001 -0.0002
Gas Stove 0.0266*** -0.0213*** 0.0008*** -0.0022***
VCR 0.0293* -0.0015** 0.0225*** 0.0000
aMarginal e⁄ects on probability of misreporting multiplied by 100. Estimation without
￿xed e⁄ects. Observations: 74034.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
17Table VII
Effect of Education on Misreporting
E⁄ect of Educationa on
Good Underreport Overreport
Concrete Floor -0.5493*** 1.1765***
Tap Water -0.3259*** 0.7088***
Toilet -0.3442*** 1.1539***
Gas Boiler -0.7411** 0.0807***




Satellite TV 0.2743 0.0386***
Water Tank -0.9232*** 0.2761***
Refrigerator 0.2068* 0.4351***
Gas Stove -0.2940*** 1.0683***
Video Recorder 0.4468* -0.0231
aMarginal e⁄ect of years of education on probability of misreporting multiplied by 100.
Estimations with moderate risk-aversion (￿ = 1) and without ￿xed e⁄ects. Observations:
74034. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
bene￿t from the program (￿ = 0) are similar in sign and magnitude to those
obtained for other assumptions on relative risk-aversion.
Using the estimates for ￿ = 1 in Table VI, we have that increasing in 40
pesos (US$ 3.63) the per capita bene￿ts from the program (that is, roughly
speaking, increasing the bene￿ts in 50%) would increase underreporting on
cars, satellite TV, gas boilers, water tanks and refrigerators in between 1.3
and 2.2 percent points, and would reduce overreporting in gas stoves, toilets,
refrigerators and washing machines in between 0.22 and 0.85 percent points.
4.3 E⁄ect of Education on Misreporting
Of the independent variables other than ￿U(Ya;Ba), education is of partic-
ular interest. If overreporting is simply or mostly the result of confusion,
we would expect more educated applicants to overreport less frequently. On
the other hand, if overreporting is at least in part the result of social em-
barrassment, we could expect more educated applicants to overreport more
18frequently than others.16
The marginal e⁄ects of education on misreporting are described in Table
VII. The e⁄ect on underreporting is calculated as one hundred times
^ ￿1gsf(^ ￿1g + ^ ￿1g￿U(Ya;Ba) + ^ ￿1gXa);
evaluated at the mean values of the exogenous variables for those having the
good, where ^ ￿1gs is the estimated coe¢ cient of school years in equation (1),
and the other terms are as de￿ned above. The e⁄ect on overreporting is
calculated similarly.
The results come squarely in favor of the embarrassment hypothesis. In
almost every item, education signi￿cantly increases the probability of over-
reporting. The e⁄ect is stronger for goods whose absence is more likely to
be embarrassing, including toilets, concrete ￿ oor and tap water.17
4.4 Was There a Penalty for Underreporting?
We analyze here whether veri￿cation was enforced, i.e. whether households
misreporting in the registration center and found to be ineligible in the ver-
i￿cation were actually excluded from the program. Table VIII shows bene￿-
ciary status by eligibility classi￿cation in the registration center and in the
veri￿cation. As expected, those found to be initially eligible in the regis-
tration center and who continue to be eligible after the veri￿cation (63,243
households) are very likely to become bene￿ciaries. We turn now to house-
holds who were classi￿ed initially eligible at the registration center and found
to be ineligible after the veri￿cation (10,791 households). Surprisingly, 31
percent of these households did in fact become bene￿ciaries. So, while the
veri￿cation was e⁄ective at excluding a majority of households who misre-
ported enough in the registration center to appear eligible when they were
16In the literature on voter turnout, for instance, the empirical fact that more educated
people tend to vote more often is interpreted as a result of more educated people being
better integrated in society and thus more susceptible to social pressure (Blais 2000).
17A potential criticism of these results is that individuals who overreported with respect
to some goods may also be inclined to overreport with respect to years of education. We
have found, however, that overreporting is more common in goods that most households
have. Since most applicants have very few years of education, having little education is
unlikely to be embarrassing.
19Table VIII
Final Status of Verified Households
Became Program
Eligibility Status Bene￿ciary
Eligible in Reg. Center but not in Veri￿cation 31.3%
Eligible in Reg. Center and in Veri￿cation 97.6%
Underreported 93.8%
Did Not Underreport 98.1%
Observations: 74034.
in fact ineligible, an important minority were able to underreport and get
into the program anyway. In terms of the model, the true probability that
veri￿cation is e⁄ective is about 0:687.
A second question is whether there is any evidence that there was a
penalty for underreporting after the household visit,18 beyond recalculating
the score. Looking at the sample of households declared eligible at the veri-
￿cation visit, there is a small di⁄erence in the percentage of households that
became bene￿ciaries between those who underreported in the registration
center and those who did not. While this might imply there was at least
a minimum penalty to underreporting beyond correcting characteristics, the
(small) di⁄erence may also re￿ ect di⁄ering take up rates between the two
groups for other reasons. Thus, there is little evidence of a rigorous or uni-
form penalty applied to underreporting beyond correction of characteristics.
4.5 The Costs of Lying and Embarrassment
According to our model, the utility cost of lying about good g for applicant
a if the applicant has this good is
cag = ￿cg + ￿cgXa + ￿cag = s1g(￿￿1g ￿ ￿1gXa + ￿1ag);
where ￿1ag has a standard logistic distribution.
We can calculate the expected utility cost of lying for an applicant as
E(maxfs1g(￿￿1g ￿ ￿1gXa + ￿1ag);0g):
18Program rules might suggest this (see footnote 10).
20Note that we bound the cost from below by zero, i.e. we interpret a negative
realization of ￿￿1g ￿ ￿1gXa + ￿1ag as meaning a zero cost of lying or no
disincentive to lie.19 Solving the expectation we obtain that the expected
utility cost of lying for an applicant that has good g is
￿s1g(￿1g + ￿1gXa) + s1g ln(1 + exp(￿1g + ￿1gXa)):




ag = ￿ Ya exp
￿
￿s1g(￿1g + ￿1gXa) + s1g ln(1 + exp(￿1g + ￿1gXa))
￿
￿ ￿ Ya;
where ￿ Ya is the total household expenditure of applicant a. Intuitively, cm
ag
represents how much money the household should receive for an applicant to
be willing to conceal having good g.
Similarly, the monetary cost of embarrassment for an applicant who does
not have good g is
e
m
ag = ￿ Ya exp
￿




ag represents how much money the household should receive for
the applicant to declare, embarrassingly, not having good g.
In order to calculate the costs of lying and embarrassment, we need to
have some estimate of the scale parameters s1g and s2g. Recall that the
applicant will overreport if
eag ￿ wg￿U(Ya;Ba)
or equivalently if
s2g￿2g￿U(Ya;Ba) + s2g(￿2g + ￿2gXa ￿ ￿2ag) ￿ 0:
We can estimate the coe¢ cients ￿2g, ￿2g and ￿2g, but not the ￿original coef-
￿cients￿s2g￿2g, s2g￿2g and s2g￿2g (see e.g. Train 2003). Note that according
19It is simple to check that the likelihood function associated with equation (1) is the
same whether we assume that ￿1ag has a standard logistic distribution or that ￿1ag has a
density identical to the standard logistic density for ￿1ag ￿ ￿1g +￿1gXa and a point mass
at ￿1ag = ￿1g + ￿1gXa, as long as ￿1g > 0.
21to the model ￿s2g￿2g is equal to !g=￿, the weight of good g according to
applicants￿beliefs multiplied by the density representing the beliefs of ap-
plicants about the poverty line. We know, however, the true weights of the
goods !T
g and the true value of the poverty line ￿T. We can approximate s2g
if we assume that applicants￿beliefs are roughly correct, as follows.
First, we assume the expected value of the poverty line according to the
applicants￿beliefs is equal to the true value of the poverty line. That is, ￿=2 =
￿T. Second, we assume that the applicants guess correctly the sum of the true
weights of all the goods we consider, even if not necessarily the true weight














g =2￿T. Finally, we assume
that s2g is the same for every good, or equivalently that the variance of ￿2ag

















g0 minf0; ^ ￿2g0g for all g:
(We censor the two estimated coe¢ cients with incorrect signs from the point
of view of the model.)
We proceed similarly with respect to s1g. Consistent with the discussion
in Section 4.4, we assume that applicants believe that the only penalty for
underreporting, in case veri￿cation is e⁄ective, is to correct underreporting












g =￿, where ￿
T is
the true probability that veri￿cation is e⁄ective. Thus, s1g can be estimated
as










g0 maxf0; ^ ￿1g0g for all g:
According to the poverty regression actually used by the program, house-
holds received a number of points for lacking certain goods and also a number
of points related to family size and region. To calculate ^ s1g and ^ s2g, we take
!T
g to be the number of points that a household gets toward qualifying for
the program for lacking good g, and we take ￿T to be the maximum number
of points that a household gets for reasons other than lacking goods, plus the
number of points a household gets for lacking all goods, minus the number
of points required to qualify for the program.
22Table IX
Median Monetary Cost of Lying and Embarrassmenta
Good Cost of Lying Cost of Embarrassment
Concrete Floor 29.25 35.89
Tap Water 29.46 45.37
Toilet 26.61 61.88
Gas Boiler 4.50 1.24




Satellite TV 5.15 1.55
Water Tank 7.83 4.32
Refrigerator 14.96 15.82
Gas Stove 21.22 45.40
Video Recorder 3.50 2.28
aIn Mexican pesos (2002); 11 pesos is approx. US$1. With moderate risk-aversion (￿ = 1)
and without ￿xed e⁄ects. Observations: 74034.
Intuitively, to estimate ^ s1g and ^ s2g we assume that applicants understand
the weight of goods vis-a-vis other criteria in eligibility to the program, but
are uncertain about the poverty line so they believe that by declaring any
good they are reducing the probability of being declared eligible.
Table IX o⁄ers the median monetary costs of lying and embarrassment.
The cost of lying for di⁄erent goods varies from close to 0 to about 2.68
US dollars, and the cost of embarrassment for the lack of di⁄erent goods
varies from close to 0 to about 5.63 US dollars. Note that the order of
magnitude of the cost of lying depends on the assumed applicants￿beliefs
about the probability that veri￿cation would be e⁄ective. As an upper bound,
if applicants did not expect veri￿cation to be e⁄ective at all, our estimates
of the cost of lying would increase threefold.
As illustrated in Figure I, both the cost of lying and the cost of embarrass-
ment about goods are positively correlated with the percentage of households
who have each good. The correlation between embarrassment costs and the
percentage of households who have each good is consistent with the idea that
embarrassment is more severe with respect to goods which are widespread in
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24the social group of the applicant. The correlation between lying costs and
the percentage of households who have each good is a bit more surprising,
and seems to indicate that it is easier to lie with regards to goods that are
uncommon in the social group of the applicant.
5 Conclusions
How much do applicants to a social program misreport their ￿true￿character-
istics when they know this information will be used to determine participation
in the program? How sensitive is misreporting to program bene￿ts? We ￿nd
that underreporting is widespread. Overreporting is common in goods whose
absence in a household is associated with poverty￿ precisely those goods that
are likely to be given some weight in the methodology employed to deter-
mine participation in a poverty-alleviation program. Both underreporting
and overreporting are sensitive to program bene￿ts, more so in the case of
underreporting.
Though the e⁄ect of program bene￿ts on misreporting is not large at
the margin, it is signi￿cant in the case of underreporting for a variety of
speci￿cations. We believe this robust result is important because applicants
were aware that underreporting could a⁄ect the probability of receiving the
program (positively by increasing the probability of qualifying for a household
visit and, perhaps, negatively by increasing the probability of being penalized
for providing false information) but they were also aware that underreporting
could not a⁄ect the bene￿ts from participating in the program. Thus, if they
were expected utility maximizers and did not su⁄er any disutility for lying
per se, their decision to underreport or report truthfully should not have
depended at all on the size of the bene￿ts from the program, so long as these
were positive. If we stick with the expected utility maximization hypothesis,
we must conclude that applicants dislike deception enough to forego some
probability of participating in a program with large bene￿ts rather than
deceiving.
There is evidence that people deviate from single-mindedly pursuing what
is best from the point of view of their individual material interests in a
variety of circumstances: they vote even though they know they are not
decisive, they give to charities and political organizations, they punish others
25at a cost to themselves when they believe they have been treated unfairly.
We show that people also deviate from single-mindedly maximizing their
individual material interests (or rather those of their family) in the setting
of a face-to-face interview with a program o¢ cial. They do so in a manner
that is consistent with the existence of a disutility for deceiving others and,
possibly, a disutility for reporting the lack of some goods whose possession
is widespread among households of a similar social condition.
From the viewpoint of the design of the process of selection of bene￿cia-
ries for targeted social programs, our research brings good and bad news.
Among the good news, underreporting is widespread but not overwhelming,
except for a few goods. Among the bad news, overreporting is common for
a few goods, which implies that self-reporting may lead to the exclusion of
deserving households. There is a wide variation in the incidence of misre-
porting for di⁄erent goods. Thus, applicants￿reports can be useful in the
context of the selection of bene￿ciaries as long as the weights assigned to
di⁄erent goods take into account the incidence of misreporting.
The crux of the ￿poverty regression￿methodology is the use of data on
household characteristics which are presumably observable and are statisti-
cally correlated with income. Our research points out that using the appli-
cants￿reports with weights obtained from a poverty regression is limited by
the extent and variance across goods of misreporting. Moreover, ￿nding the
optimal weights is complex because the incidence of misreporting will not
be constant with changes in the targeting methodology. That is, the issue
of determining the optimal weights is not purely statistical but involves a
strategic component.
More generally, our work suggests that the design of social programs can
be improved by taking into account current research on the actual behavior
of individuals in contexts that combine economic incentives with ethical and
social considerations. And vice versa, the evidence coming from social pro-
grams o⁄ers a window to understanding the behavior of individuals in those
contexts.
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